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Abstract. In this work we extend the model developed in (Aoki
and Hu, 2003) in order to cover cost reduction innovations, instead
of product innovations originally developed on that article. The re-
sults show that smaller innovations are more licensable. Regarding
the time factors, infringers like faster innovation and patentees pre-
fer bigger innovations and longer imitation periods. Under some
suitable situations, litigation time could support innovation and
discourage infringement. However the patent life has ambiguous
effects and may promote infringement.
1. Introduction
Patents are, by their own right, an interesting topic of study, in part
because there is no clear conclusion about the balance between the
positive effects (promote innovations) and the negative ones (market
power for example) of having a patent system. However, there are
other points to take into account since nowadays, some of them relate
to the complexity of patent rights. Such complexities are derived from
the actual development of science and the efficiency of the legal system
to determine whether an invention is in fact a nontrivial improvement
of knowledge.
The other dimension is related with the complexity of the actual
technology, i.e. a cell phone needs more than one hundred different
patented technologies. So in many cases a developer of a product faces
several patent holders in order to develop a final product, and several
of those technologies could complement one of the others (fragmented
patents).
The term probabilistic patents has its origins on the possibility that
a patent can be declared invalid in a court. This happens because the
control of the patent office is not absolute and sometimes that institu-
tion endorses patents to innovations that do not fulfill the requirements
to be patented (most commonly inventive step). Even firms dealing
with market competition could hold these weak patents (patent with
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high probability to be declared invalid under litigation)and license its
competitors taking together with the other firms the market prize of
the patent (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008).
There are several studies about patent litigation; the first ones study
their relationship with settlements by using bargaining models. Inside
these models they try several variations of consequences on the informa-
tion of probabilistic patents. (Bebchuk, 1984; Meurer, 1989), in these
earlier models the failure to reach agreements are mere consequence of
information failures.
Another group of important studies come from Aoki and Hu (1999)
that analyze the effect of the legal system on licensing and litigation,
they characterize the legal system by the strength of patents and legal
costs. They conclude that a legal system that induces a monopoly
power incentive research, also they found that longer litigation is better
for innovator and imitators (Aoki and Hu, 2003); those results were
found for the case of product innovations.
Nevertheless, some analysts think that in the last step, the strength
of a patent comes from a position of the responsible court that in some
cases could be pro patent protection (Bessen and Meurer, 2005). This
proposition has important consequences on markets and social welfare
in the actual system of incentives to innovation and in all sectors and
systems related with innovations. Many of these arguments and results
of several years of empirical and theoretical research summarized in
Bessen and Meurer (2008), show the importance of the study of the
actual patent litigation policies and its deficiencies in some cases.
Consequently, there is a gap related to patent litigation and its rela-
tionship with innovation, licensing and settlement when the innovation
is a process innovation. When an innovation is a process innovation
there are several more difficulties, because in the case of product in-
novations markets with two competitors are duopolies with the same
technology or just a monopoly. However in the case of process innova-
tions, the competitors stay in the market even if they do not exploit
the innovation and have an inferior technology.
In a market with two firms, firm 1 (patentee) and firm 2 (competitor,
potential infringer or licensee) this work attempts to explore the effects
of time factors in specific litigation and imitation times on the licensing,
litigation and settlement of process innovations. In this way we use the
base model by Aoki and Hu (2003). However it is necessary to work
on some specific duopoly and simple games, in order to explain what is
going to happen in those scenarios that differ from those that product
innovations produce. In the section 2 we solve some static duopoly
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games that help out to describe a model that models licensing, imita-
tion, litigation and settlement of a cost reduction innovation in a one
shot Cournot game. Afterwards in the section 3 we describe the main
model, that is basically a game in extensive form. This model is solved
by backward induction throughout the subsections 4.1 to 4.4. After
then we use the results found in the previous sections and compare
these results in the sense of social welfare (consumer surplus added to
the profits of the firms). Finally we finish with concise conclusions.
2. Particular equilibria
It is important before considering our main model, to study some
simple models which are later going to be used in order to extend
the model by Aoki and Hu (2003) and to include process innovations
instead of product innovations. So in this section we solve three simple
duopoly models with linear demands, the setup being as follows:
• There are two firms: firm 1 and firm 2
• firm 1 and firm 2, both produce a homogeneous good and face
an inverse linear demand given by:
(2.1) p = 1− q1 − q2
- both firms compete in this markets choosing quantities (Cournout).
• Without loss of generality, we assume that the firms initially
produce under a constant marginal cost of ci = 0;
• The firm 1 obtains a cost reduction innovation of size  ∈ (0, 1),
in this way its marginal cost is now c1 = −
• Such cost reduction innovation is patented.
• In this way the profit function for the firm i is:
pii(qi, qj) = (1− qi − qj − ci)qi
- where qj represents the offered quantity by the other firm.
2.1. Duopoly under same technology. At this case both firms pro-
duce goods with the same technology, and it is important to character-
ize a situation where an infringer uses the patented technology without
any consequence. By solving the game, the equilibrium quantities are:
(2.2) qa1 = q
a
2 =
1 + 
3
and the equilibrium profits are
pia1 =
(
1 + 
3
)2
pia2 =
(
1 + 
3
)2
(2.3)
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2.2. Duopoly under different technologies. In this case there is no
licensing and firms just compete as Cournot with different costs, so firm
1 enjoys the innovation and firm 2 produces with the old technology.
We are going to use this case when the potential infringer decides not
to infringe and produce under the inferior technology, so by solving the
game we have:
qb1 =
1 + 2
3
qb2 =
1− 
3
(2.4)
and the the equilibrium profits under this setup are easily calculated
as
pib1 =
(
1 + 2
3
)2
pib2 =
(
1− 
3
)2
(2.5)
2.3. Duopoly under the same technology and an expected rea-
sonable royalty rate. We should also consider the cases where there
is infringement and a suit from the patentee, so the quantities chosen
by the firms in the Cournot competition are made under the shadow
of damage payments and injunctions. In this case both firms produce
under the same technology, but in the case of firm 2, it infringes the
patented technology and as consequence, firm 1 sues the other firm. If
the patent is declared valid and infringed, then the infringer (firm 2)
has to pay a reasonable royalty rate τ by each unit sold; the proba-
bility that the innovation will be declared valid is common knowledge
θ ∈ (0, 1)
So in this case the payoff functions are:
pi1(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + )q1 + θτq2(2.6)
pi2(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + − θτ)q2(2.7)
where θτq2 is the expected rent for the firm 1,so in this case the
equilibrium quantities are:
qc1 =
1 + + τθ
3
qc2 =
1 + − 2τθ
3
(2.8)
and the equilibrium profits are
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pic1 =
(
1 + + τθ
3
)2
+ θτ
1 + − 2τθ
3
(2.9)
pic2 =
(
1 + − 2τθ
3
)2
(2.10)
We assume that τ ∈ (0, 1) and in some cases we also are going to
assume that τ ≤ 
3. Model
The main model is based in the model of (Aoki and Hu, 2003); that
model studies the effect of time factors on the licensing of a product
innovation. Here we will use the same structure in order to evaluate
the impact of time factors on the imitation and litigation when the
innovation is a process innovation1.
The temporal setting and the description of the game is as follows:
(1) At the very beginning firm 1 gets a cost reduction innovation
with a patent life of γ periods, A license is offered to firm 2 in
the form of a ”take or leave it” offer. This offer is a fixed fee F ,
firm 2 then has two options: accept the license an produce with
the same technology or reject it. If firm 2 accepts the offer the
game ends and both firms produce under the same technology,
for γ periods .
(2) If there is no licensing firm 2 has to decide whether to imitate
the technology or just stay with the old technology. If firm 2
decides not to imitate, then the game ends with a duopoly where
the firms produce under different technologies, for γ periods.
(3) If firm 2 decided to imitate, imitation needs an investment of
h and takes α periods. when the imitation is complete, firm
1 can litigate in order to stop infringement or just leave the
things as they are. if the firm 1 decides not to litigate the game
ends, with both firms producing under the same technology.
So then during the period of imitation firms produce under
different technologies and after the γ − α remaining periods,
they produce with the same technology.
(4) If litigation is chosen by firm 1, the trial is going to end β
periods after ( where β ≤ γ − α). At the very beginning of
the legal process, firm 1 can offer a settlement by a fixed fee
1In a difference of the model by Aoki and Hu (2003), our model is discrete,
also we do not consider the effect of the temporal discount factor without loss of
generality.
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K, this offer again is a ”take or leave it” offer. If the firm 2
accepts, both firms end producing under the same technology
for the remain γ − α periods.
(5) If there is no settlement, both firms continue producing but
under the shadow of a royalty rate τ that should be paid if
the patent is declared valid and infringed. The probability that
this happens is a common knowledge value θ ∈ (0, 1). Also, if
the patent is declared valid and infringed the infringer firm 2
stops using the technology till the end of the life of patent, and
produces under the old technology. Consequence of this legal
process each firm pays a litigation cost by `1 and `2.
A NI NL S
NSLINA2 2 21
V A1 , V
A
2 V
NI
1 , V
NI
2 V
NL
1 , V
NL
2 V
S
1 , V
S
2
V NS1 , V
NS
2
Figure 1. Game tree of the process
The figure 1 shows the structure of the game, unfortunately the real
game tree should be a lot bigger the one that is shown, even so we will
call the figure 1 as tree of the game, because this graph gives a good
reference of the over all game.
In order to define the values for all cases, we are going to use our
basic results obtained in the last section,and we characterize the values
of payoffs for firm i under scenario k as V ki .
Now we proceed to characterize the payoffs, using the equilibrium
profits of section 2, utilizing a finite repeated game2
(1) In the case that firm 2 accepts the license, it pays a fixed fee
of F , and both firms produce under the same technology as a
Duopoly during the patent life γ. We have the following payoffs:
V A1 = γpi
a
1 + F(3.1)
V A2 = γpi
a
2 − F(3.2)
(2) In the case where there is no licensing and where firm 2 decides
not to imitate the innovation, we see that firm 1 produces with
2In a finite repeated game the equilibrium in each period is the Nash solution of
the one shot game, so we just multiply the equilibrium profits on section 2 in order
to calculate the payoffs
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the new technology and firm 2 produces with the old technology
for the γ periods. In consequence payoffs are:
V NI1 = γpi
b
1(3.3)
V NI2 = γpi
b
2(3.4)
(3) If firm 1 decides to imitate and makes it at a cost of h, after
which if firm 1 (patent holder) decides not to litigate, both firms
act as a duopoly with the same costs for the last γ−α periods,
and in the first α periods (time required to imitate) firm 1 has
lower costs than firm 2, so we have the following payoffs:
V NL1 = αpi
b
1 + (γ − α)pia1(3.5)
V NL2 = αpi
b
2 + (γ − α)pia2 − h(3.6)
(4) In the case where firm 1 decides to litigate, firm 1 makes a
take it or leave it offer by K. If a settlement is achieved firm
2 produces under the same costs as firm 1 for the remaining
periods, and pays K to the firm 1, then:
V S1 = αpi
b
1 + (γ − α)pia1 +K(3.7)
V S2 = αpi
b
2 + (γ − α)pia2 − h−K(3.8)
(5) The most complex case emerges when there is no settlement
after infringement and after both firms have been unable to
reach a licensing accord. So after α periods, both firms produce
under the shadow of expected cost and expected benefits of τq2
for β periods. With the probability of θ that firm 1 will win, it is
going to produce with lower costs than firm 2 for the remaining
γ−α−β periods; with a probability of (1−θ) both will produce
with the same costs for the remaining γ−α− β periods and in
this case, both firms pay litigation costs by `i each period. So:
V NS1 =αpi
b
1 + βpi
c
1 + θ(γ − α− β)pib1 + (1− θ)(γ − α− β)pia1 − β`1
(3.9)
V NS2 =αpi
b
2 + βpi
c
2 + θ(γ − α− β)pib2 + (1− θ)(γ − α− β)pia2
− β`2 − h(3.10)
4. Equilibrium of the model
In this section we solve the model by backward induction. First
we determinate the equilibrium solution for the fixed fee optimal for
settlement, and then with these results, we can explore the optimal
choices of litigation, imitation and licensing recursively.
8 MARTIN H. BARRENECHEA
4.1. Settlement. As previously described firm 1 makes a ”take-it-or-
leave-it” option of a fixed fee settlement. If we assume that this fixed
fee exists that value should be enough to compensate the payoff that
firms should receive in the case of no settlement3.
The settlement conditions depends of the payoff of firm 2, by as-
suming a take it or leave it offer, K? should be such that makes
V S2
?
= V NS2
?
, so:
K? = −βpic2 − θ(γ − α− β)pib2 − (1− θ)(γ − α− β)pia2 + β`2 + (γ − α)pia2
= (θ(γ − α− β) + β)pia2 − θ(γ − α− β)pib2 − βpic2 + β`2
= θ(γ − α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ 0
(4.1)
Now because pia2 ≥ pib2 and pia2 ≥ pic2 (the better situation happens
when firm 2 uses the innovation without paying any fee or royalty),
so K? ≥ 0, it implies that the settlement condition depends only on
the payoff of firm 1. In this case we should note that the equilibrium
payoffs should hold :
V S1
? ≥ V NS1 ?
- by developing this condition
αpib1 + (γ − α)pia1 +K? ≥ αpib1 + βpic1 + θ(γ − α− β)pib1+
(1− θ)(γ − α− β)pia1 − β`1
K? ≥ β(pic1 − pia1) + θ(γ − α− β)(pib1 − pia1)− β`1
by using the value of K?
θ(γ − α− β)(pia2 − pib2)+
β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ β(pic1 − pia1) + θ(γ − α− β)(pib1 − pia1)− β`1
β(`1 + `2) ≥ β(pic1 + pic2 − pia1 − pia2)+
θ(γ − α− β)(pib1 + pib2 − pia1 − pia2)
- in consequence, the settlement condition is:
(4.2)
∑
i
`i ≥
(∑
i
pici −
∑
i
piai
)
+θ
(
γ − α
β
− 1
)(∑
i
pibi −
∑
i
piai
)
Now we have:
3? symbol is used to denote the equilibrium solution.
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(4.3)
∑
i
pici −
∑
i
piai =
θτ
9
(1 + − θτ) ≥ 0
which is positive.
About the other term we have that
(4.4)
∑
i
pibi −
∑
i
piai = −

9
(2− 3)
when the effect of the innovation is lower than 2/3, the term is negative
and is going to be positive where  > 2/3.
With such facts it is easy to get to know the effects of some variables
as the patent life and others on the suitability of litigation using the
eq. 4.2 , just some few comments are necessary for the case of θ and τ
and in the other ones the result is direct.
Because
(4.5)
∂
∑
pici
∂θ
=
τ
9
(1 + − 2θτ) ≥ 0
bigger patent strength makes less suitable settlement just for bigger
innovations because the term
∑
i pi
b
i −
∑
i pi
a
i in the equation 4.2 is just
positive for  > 2/3.
About the royalty rate we have that
(4.6)
∂
∑
pici
∂τ
=
θ
9
(1 + − 2θτ) ≥ 0
so more royalty rate is less suitable to have a settlement. These facts
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. It is more suitable to have settlement when:
(1) litigation costs are higher,
(2) patent life γ is longer when  < 2/3 and shorter when  > 2/3
(3) imitation time α is shorter when  < 2/3 and longer when  >
2/3
(4) litigation time β is shorter when  < 2/3 and longer when  >
2/3
(5) the patent strength θ is lower if  > 2/3
(6) the reasonable rate τ is lower
It is important to see the results of proposition 4.1, and the effects
that change in relation to the size of the innovation. This is because
when an innovation is substantial, the cumulated profit of both firms
producing under the same technology is lower than the rent when they
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produce under different technologies. There is a scenario to have a
settlement accord in order that the patentee has more bargaining power
(because it makes the offer in the take it or leave scheme ), the patentee
will ask for a bigger share in order to settle, and these effects are
amplified by the patent life and decreased by the imitation time and
the litigation time. For the case of smaller innovations ( < 2/3), the
effects are reversed.
Now when there is a settlement, firm 2 pays K? to firm 1, this value
is positive as we saw before, the value of this is:
(4.7) K? = θ(γ − α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2
By doing easy calculations we get:
∂K?
∂α
= −θ(pia2 − pib2) ≤ 0
Because (pia2 − pib2) > 0,this means that if the time for imitation is
longer the settlement should be lower. This happens as a consequence
that the firm has less time to explore the benefits of innovation along
bigger profits, also
∂K?
∂γ
= θ(pia2 − pib2) ≥ 0
by the oppossing reason, so bigger patent lifetime makes the settlement
fee bigger. Now, about the effect of litigation time it comes
∂K?
∂β
= −θ(pia2 − pib2) + (pia2 − pic2) + `2
= −4
9
θ
(
− τ − τ + θτ 2)+ `2
So by trying to characterize an expected royalty rate (or desired), it
should be fair to assume that τ = , it ends as:
(4.8)
∂K?
∂β
=
4
9
2(1− θ)θ + `2 ≥ 0 if τ = 
So when the reasonable royalty rate is fair 4 litigation time has a
positive effect on the settlement fee.
As expected
(4.9)
∂K?
∂`2
= β ≥ 0
4see Farrell and Shapiro (2008) for a discussion of the ratio between  and τ ,
given that in some cases it could be possible that τ > 
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, so bigger litigation costs increases the settlement fee.The effect of the
strength of the patent θ on K? is
(4.10)
∂K?
∂θ
= (γ − α− β)(pia2 − pib2)− β
∂pic2
∂θ
≥ 0
which is positive because
∂pic2
∂θ
≤ 0, in that way innovations with more
strength will be settled with greater settlement fees. Finally about the
effect of the reasonable royalty rate we have that
(4.11)
∂K?
∂τ
= −β∂pi
c
2
∂τ
≥ 0
this result comes because
∂pic2
∂τ
≤ 0.
In consequence we get the following proposition
Proposition 4.2.
∂K?
∂α
≤ 0; ∂K
?
∂γ
≥ 0; ∂K
?
∂β
≥ 0 when τ = ; ∂K
?
∂`2
≥
0;
∂K?
∂θ
≥ 0; ∂K
?
∂τ
≥ 0
This proposition reflects the fact that time factors amplify the im-
pacts of rents difference under the different technologies, that are more
or less in our setup captured by the patentee, in relation to the le-
gal system (θ, τ, `) these variables improve the bargaining power of the
patentee and in consequence affect the settlement fee.
4.2. Litigation. By solving the game, we back another stage (see fig-
ure 1)to the choice of firm 1 to litigate or not to litigate. At this point
we have to consider the two possible scenarios (Settlement and No Set-
tlement). There is no Litigation if V NL1
∗
< V S1
∗
when settlement takes
place in the next stage, or V NL1
∗
< V NS1
∗
when there is no settlement in
the next stage. We consider the payoffs of firm 2 equal in equilibrium
under both situations, it is understood the optimal fee is positive (see
eq.(4.7)).
If there is settlement we have:
V S1
∗ − V NL1 ∗ = K? > 0
So we have that
(4.12) V S1
∗
> V NL1
∗
Now if there is no settlement in the next stage, it happens because:
V NS1
∗
> V S1
∗
By using the eq. 4.12 we have
(4.13) V NS1
∗
> V NL1
∗
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This make us conclude that :
Proposition 4.3. Litigation is always optimal for firm 1
This result is quite important because it shows that independently
the innovation’s size and the patent strength is always optimal for the
patentee to litigate when infringement happens.
4.3. Imitation. Imitation is going to take place if V NI2
?
< V S2
?
. This
eventually happens independently of if there is or not settlement. This
is because the settlement fixed fee is such that V S2
?
= V NS2
?
, so we can
obtain the imitation condition as V NI2
?
< V S2
?
.
By developing this condition, we obtain
αpib2 + (γ − α)pia2 − h−K? > γpib2
G = (γ − α)(pia2 − pib2)− h−K? > 0
It means that the imitation condition is G > 0. By deriving the time
variables we have that:
(4.14)
∂G
∂α
= −(pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂α
= −(1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) < 0
(4.15)
∂G
∂γ
= (pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂γ
= (1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) > 0
(4.16)
∂G
∂β
= −∂K
?
∂β
< 0 if τ = 
Essentially these effects represent the incentives to imitations be-
cause longer patent life, short imitation time and lower litigation time
make the infringement premium greater for the potential infringer (firm
2), by summarizing:
Proposition 4.4. There is more suitability to have imitation, when:
(1) The imitation time α is lower;
(2) The patent life γ is bigger;
(3) The litigation time β is lower when τ = 
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Also we can take derivatives in respect of the variables that represent
the legal system, so:
∂G
∂θ
= −∂K
?
∂θ
≤ 0(4.17)
∂G
∂τ
= −∂K
?
∂τ
≤ 0(4.18)
∂G
∂`2
= −∂K
?
∂`2
≤ 0(4.19)
If the legal variables have some direction to support the patentee
system (higher patent strength, higher royalty rates, and high cost of
litigation for the infringer). They reduce the feasibility of infringement,
because these directly affect the settlement payment, making it greater
and the premium of infringement is made lower, so:
Proposition 4.5. There is less suitability to have imitation, when:
(1) The patent strength θ is higher;
(2) The reasonable royalty rate τ is higher;
(3) The litigation cost for the firm 2 `2 is higher.
One aspect that is quite interesting, is to explore at this stage the
impact of time effects on the payoffs of patentee and potential infringer.
By starting with the infringer we proceed to calculate the derivatives
V S2
∗ 5 with respect to the time variables α, β and γ. It is observed in
figure 1 given that litigation is active, there are two potential scenarios:
Settlement and No Settlement. It was discussed before if the equilib-
rium payoffs for firm 2 are equal, we can have the impacts of time
variables on the incentives to infringe just deriving V S2
∗
respect to the
time variables, so:
(4.20)
∂V S2
∗
∂α
= −(pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂α
= −(1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) < 0
(4.21)
∂V S2
∗
∂β
= −∂K
∗
∂β
≤ 0 if τ = 
(4.22)
∂V S2
∗
∂γ
= pia2 −
∂K?
∂γ
= pia2 − θ(pia2 − pib2) = (1− θ)pia2 + θpib2 > 0
Because the impact of the imitation time is negative it is optimal for
the infringer to imitate as fast as possible. One counterintuitive result
5We obtain this equilibrium payoff by replacing the equilibrium values of K? in
equation 3.7, we act is similar way for the other equilibrium payoffs.
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is the impact of the patent life, the greater the incentive to infringe,
because it is possible to get greater rents throughout settlement accord
and enjoy the innovation together with the patentee, for a bigger period
of time. However the impact of the litigation time is negative when
τ =  (fair compensation), because longer periods of litigation reduce
the premium of infringement along the litigation costs that eventually
make the settlement fee greater, as is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.6.
∂V S2
∗
∂α
< 0,
∂V S2
∗
∂β
< 0 if τ = ,
∂V S2
∗
∂γ
> 0
By working in the same way as before, only this time for the patentee,
we have to compare the two payoffs under both scenarios: 1) Settlement
and 2) No Settlement.
Then we start deriving the payoff of the patentee in respect of the
imitation time under the first scenario, as
∂V S1
∗
∂α
= pib1 − pia1 +
∂K?
∂α
= pib1 − pia1 − θ(pia2 − pib2) =
1
9
(2 + 3− 4θ)
This term in most of the cases is positive, and in particular it is
positive if  > 2/3 (bigger innovations). However, it could be nega-
tive if the innovation is small enough at least  < 2/3 and with very
high patent strength θ >
2 + 
4
> 1/2, so the patentee with bigger
innovations benefit from a longer imitation.
(4.23)
∂V S1
∗
∂β
=
∂K?
∂β
> 0 if τ = 
Litigation time has a direct consequential effect of increasing the
settlement fee that is positive under the suitable assumption that τ = ,
meaning that longer periods of litigation benefit the patentee, when a
fair royalty rate is applied. Finally making the derivatives of the payoff
of patentee respect the patent life we get that:
(4.24)
∂V S1
∗
∂γ
= pia1 +
∂K?
∂γ
= pia1 + θ(pi
a
2 − pib2) > 0
So this equation shows that in the scenario of a settlement that longer
patent life benefits the patentee, and summarizing the results, we get
the following proposition
Proposition 4.7.
∂V S1
∗
∂α
> 0 if  > 2/3 ,
∂V S1
∗
∂β
> 0 if τ = ,
∂V S1
∗
∂γ
>
0
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By working under the last scenario ”No Settlement” and making the
calculations of the derivatives, we get that:
(4.25)
∂V NS1
∗
∂α
= (1− θ)(pib1 − pia1) > 0
(4.26)
∂V NS1
∗
∂γ
= θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 > 0
This means that imitation and longer patent life improves the payoff of
the patentee. By calculating the derivative in respect to the litigation
time, we get:
∂V NS1
∗
∂β
= pic1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 − `1
The first term is
pic1−θpib1+(1−θ)pia1 =
1
9
(
3
(
1− θ2)+ (2 + )(1− θ) + 22 (1− θ2)) > 0
which is positive, then:
(4.27) if τ = 

∂V NS1
∗
∂β
> 0, if `1 < pi
c
1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 ;
∂V NS1
∗
∂β
< 0, if `1 > pi
c
1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1).
We conclude that longer litigation benefits the patentee under a fair
royalty rate if the litigation costs for the patentee are smaller and re-
verting the effect if they are bigger or when there is no settlement.
Proposition 4.8.
∂V NS1
∗
∂α
> 0,
∂V NS1
∗
∂β
> 0 if `1 < pi
c
1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 ,
∂V NS1
∗
∂γ
> 0
We can collate these results as they impact on the incentives to
innovate or to infringement, in the following table:
Imitation time Litigation time Patent Life
Infringement − − if τ =  +
Innovation + if  > 2/3 + if τ = , and smaller `1 +
Table 1. Impacts of time variables on infringement and innovation.
We can conclude that the effect of patent life have ambiguous effects
as it supports innovation (making the patentee payoff better off in all
situations ) but also supports infringement (because longer patent life
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make the incentives to infringe greater). The imitation time as we have
seen before, infringers like fast innovation; in the case of innovators with
greater innovation they will prefer slower imitation. Time of litigations
seems to show that it is worse for the infringer in all cases, and in some
cases supports innovation on the probability that litigation costs for
the patentee are diminished.
4.4. Licensing. In the study of licensing there are 3 possible scenarios:
(1) No imitation
(2) Imitation and no settlement
(3) Imitation and settlement
But as we saw in equilibrium, the payoff of firm 2 is the same whether
there is settlement or not. For this reason we have two possible fixed
fee values, and three different scenarios for the patentee.
4.4.1. Licensing under not imitation. If we assume the case that the
backward solution is consistent with no imitation, it is certain firm 1
is offered a license fee FNI
?
that make V NI2
?
= V A2
?
so we have that:
V A2 = γpi
a
2 − FNI? = γpib2 = V NI2
FNI
?
= γ(pia2 − pib2)
FNI
?
=
4
9
 ≥ 0
(4.28)
Now we should see if licensing under this condition is feasible for the
firm 1,
V A1 − V NI1 =
=γpia1 + F
NI? − γpib1 =
=γ(pia1 − pib1) + γ(pia2 − pib2) =
=γ
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
=
γ
9
(2− 3)
(4.29)
When the imitation does not hold , the licensing condition depends
solely upon the size of the cost reduction innovation,
Proposition 4.9. When no imitate is optimal for the firm 2, there is
a positive optimal fixed fee FNI
?
if there is licensing, and the licensing
condition is  ≤ 2/3, meaning that big innovations are never licensed
and small innovations are always licensed. Also it is more suitable to
have licensing when the patent life is longer.
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4.4.2. Licensing under imitation and no settlement. Certainly firm 1
is offered a license fee F I
?
that makes V A2
?
= V S2
?
= V NS2
?
so we can
get this value by developing this equation as:
V A2 = γpi
a
2 − F I? = αpib2 + (γ − α)pia2 − h−K? = V S2
F I
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h+K?
F I
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h+ θ(γ − α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ 0
(4.30)
Now we explore firm 1’s payoffs under licensing V A1 and no licensing,
so the difference is:
H =V A1 − V NS1 =
=γpia1 + F
I? − (αpib1 + βpic1 + θ(γ − α− β)pib1 + (1− θ)(γ − α− β)pia1 − β`1)
=F I
?
+ α(pia1 − pib1) + θ(γ − α− β)(pia1 − pib1) + β(pia1 − pic1) + β`1 =
by using the value of F I
?
from eq.4.30
=α
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
+ θ(γ − α− β)
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
+ β
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pici
)
+
∑
i
β`i
(4.31)
Unfortunately this expression is not always positive because the term
(
∑
i pi
a
i −
∑
i pi
c
i ) is negative when τ = , the other terms being positive,
so when H is positive there is licensing and in other cases there is no
licensing.
If we derive H in order to the time variables we get that:
∂H
∂α
= (1− θ)
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
=
(1− θ)
9
(2− 3)
∂H
∂γ
= θ
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
=
θ
9
(2− 3)
So it means in both cases that the impacts are going to depend on the
size of the innovation , so the impact of greater imitation time and
longer patent life makes a license more suitable in small innovations
and the effect is contrary in a significant innovation.
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Litigation time we have that
∂H
∂β
=− θ
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
+
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pici
)
+
∑
i
`i
− θ
9
(2− 3)+
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pici
)
+
∑
i
`i
(4.32)
Now because we have that∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pici =
1
9
θτ(−1− + θτ) < 0
we can say that
∂H
∂β
> 0 if and only if
∑
i
`i > θ
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
−
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pici
)
Now in the case of θ we have that
∂H
∂θ
=(γ − α− β)
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
− β
∑
i
∂pici
∂θ
(γ − α− β)1
9
(2− 3)− β 1
9
τ(1 + − 2θτ)
(4.33)
which is negative for bigger innovations, and finally calculating the
derivative respect τ
∂H
∂τ
=− β
∑
i
∂pici
∂τ
− β
9
θ(1 + − 2θτ) < 0
(4.34)
Proposition 4.10. When there is imitation and no settlement as con-
sistent choices, it is more suitable to have an accord of licensing , when
there are:
(1) Longer (Smaller) imitation periods and patent life for small
(big) innovations
(2) Longer litigation periods if litigation costs are high enough
(3) Lower patent strength and reasonable royalty rates.
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4.4.3. Licensing under imitation and settlement. In this case we con-
sider again the following fixed fee
F I
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h+K?
Using the definitions of the payoffs of the patentee we compare both
payoffs in order to get the licensing conditions in this case, so:
V A1 − V S1 =
=γpia1 + F
I? − αpib1 − (γ − α)pia1 −K? =
=α(pia1 + pi
a
2 − pib1 − pib2) + h =
=α
(∑
i
piai −
∑
i
pibi
)
+ h =
α
9
(2− 3)+ h
(4.35)
Proposition 4.11. In the scenario where imitation and settlement are
optimal choices, smaller innovations are licensed and it is more suitable
to have licensing when the imitation time is longer and the cost of
imitation are higher.
What we see in the last three propositions is:
(1) Small innovations are more suitable to be licensed
(2) Longer patent life has a limited effect to promote licensing,
eventually just in the case of no imitation or in some cases of
small innovations.
(3) Improve the patent strength and reasonable royalty rates (penal-
ties for infringement)in some cases are against licensing, because
improves the situation of the patentee when licensing contracts
are bargained.
5. Welfare Analysis
5.1. Welfare Analysis of simple games. The welfare indicator we
are going to use is the sum of the consumer surplus plus the sum of
profits of the firms, and because the models are linear, the general form
of social welfare is
SW =
∑
i
pii +
(∑
i
qi
)2
2
So in simple cases by using simple substitution of the formulas in the
section 2 we have that, the social welfare for the cases: a) Duopoly
under same technology; b) Duopoly under different technologies; c)
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Duopoly under same technology but under the shadow of reasonable
royalty rates:
SW a =
4
9
(1 + )2(5.1)
SW b =
1
18
(
8 + 8+ 112
)
(5.2)
SW c =
1
18
(2 + 2− θτ)(4 + 4+ θτ)(5.3)
Now it should be interesting to compare different situations so we
have that:
SW a − SW b = 1
18
(8− 3)(5.4)
SW a − SW c = 1
18
θτ(2 + 2+ θτ)(5.5)
SW c − SW b = 1
18
(
8− 32 − 2θτ − 2θτ − θ2τ 2)(5.6)
The first two expressions are positive, but the last one needs an extra
condition. Using the condition τ = , the three conditions are positive,
so we have:
Proposition 5.1. SW a > SW b, SW a > SW c and SW b > SW c if
τ = 
5.2. Welfare Analysis. We are going to have several scenarios, listed
below:
(1) Ex ante licensing A, in this case
(5.7) SWA = γSW a
(2) No ex ante licensing and no imitation NI, so
(5.8) SWNI = γSW b
(3) No ex ante licensing, imitation, and no settlement NS, so
SWNS =αSW b + βSW c + θ(γ − α− β)SW b+
(1− θ)(γ − α− β)SW a − β
∑
i
`i − h(5.9)
(4) No ex ante licensing, imitation, and settlement S, so
(5.10) SW S = αSW b + (γ − α)SW a − h
By fast comparisons of SWA ≥ SWNI , SWA ≥ SWNS, SWA ≥ SW S,
it means that the better situations happens when there is ex ante li-
censing,
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Proposition 5.2. The best situation from the point of view of social
welfare is licensing.
6. Conclusions
Related with the litigation costs of patents, Bessen and Meurer
(2005) point out that innovations with small rewards at risk (less than
one million of USD) make the median estimate of a half million in to-
tal litigation costs and for median rewards at risk (1-25 million) the
estimated median of legal costs is 2 million, then these results are com-
patible with the possibility of firms settling in cases of weak and small
patents that are the cause of the greater legal costs. This fact is consis-
tent with the opinion and data of some authors that the greater share
of patent disputes settle (see PWC (2014)) , comes as a consequence of
the higher legal costs and is consistent with the results of the model.
Time factors are relevant in the sense that they amplify the effects of
other variables, such as reasonable royalty rates and patent strength,
but in some cases, time factors have direct effects, as can be shown in
the table 1. Infringers will minimize the imitation time and innovators
with significant innovations prefer longer imitation times. Also under
suitable longer litigation times have desirable results in order to pro-
mote innovation and discourage infringement. However the patent life
has an ambiguous effect because it supports innovation as infringement.
One relevant point is that much of the analysis shows that the legal
system variables i.e. legal costs, patent strength and royalty rates have
important interference on the bargaining power of patentees. So it is
important that the patent strength that represents the probability that
the patentee wins in a patent dispute represents the real meaning of
innovation as a discovery, and its inventor has to receive an incentive
in such a way that continues research.
Some of the results have shown the importance of the size of in-
novation in order to measure the magnitude of several policies. So we
have to consider there should be different economic policies for different
combinations of patent size and patent strength.
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